Asia Times Special

Asia Times:
Bunkered down for a war of attrition

By Sami Moubayed
Jul 22, 2006

DAMASCUS - Israel entered the war in Lebanon to liquidate Hezbollah. If it can free its two captive soldiers (seized on July 12), this would be a plus for the Israelis. But the real objective of the war is to destroy Hassan Nasrallah and his Hezbollah.

Israel succeeded in expelling Yasser Arafat from Lebanon in 1982 and it believes that with military might, it can do the same today to Nasrallah. The war has dragged on into its 10th day and looks as if it's going to be a long and deadly war of attrition - at the expense of innocent Lebanese and Israeli civilians dying on both sides.

Both Nasrallah and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert have cornered themselves into difficult positions, making an exit strategy at this stage extremely problematical. Surrendering now without concrete gains for Lebanese and Israeli public opinion would be political suicide for Nasrallah and Olmert.

The Israeli premier entered this war and promised the Israelis he would liberate the two Israeli soldiers and crush Hezbollah. Not only has Olmert failed to achieve both targets, but Hezbollah missiles have landed on Israeli towns such as Safad, Acre, Haifa, Tiberias, Kiryat Shmona and the biblical city of Nazareth.

Hezbollah has managed to kill 29 people in Israel, 14 of them soldiers. These attacks have greatly embarrassed the Israeli government. Nasrallah finds himself in a similar situation. He entered this war promising his people to release Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails and liberate the Israeli-occupied Sheba Farms. Not only has he failed to achieve both targets, but Israel is literarily destroying Lebanon.

At the time of writing, casualties in Lebanon are 330 dead and more than 500,000 displaced people. After suffering so much for this war, the Lebanese would not accept anything less than complete victory. If Nasrallah surrenders now, his people will ask: "Why did you go to war in the first place if this was going to be the result?"

Meanwhile, a bone-breaking battle continues between Israel and Hezbollah. On Wednesday, Israel launched its strongest offensive into Lebanon, with 200 air strikes, killing at least 70 Lebanese. The following day witnessed more Israel assaults by jets and gunboats on south Lebanon and the Shi'ite district in the suburbs of Beirut. This neighborhood, known as al-Dahiyyieh, has been flattened by continuous bombing at an interval of every 10 minutes since July 12.

Previously safe places, such as the village of Choueifat and the Christian Ashrafiyyieh neighborhood of Beirut, suffered attacks in recent days. Israel landed 23 tons of explosives on a bunker near Burj al-Barajneh, which it claimed Nasrallah was using as a command base.

Hezbollah denied that Nasrallah was there and he gave an interview to the Doha-based Al-Jazeera TV on Thursday, refuting all claims that he had been wounded. Using defiant language to lift the moral of his followers, Nasrallah said, "If the entire universe came [to pressure Hezbollah] it will not bring back the Israeli soldiers unless through indirect negotiations and a prisoner swap."

Israeli elite units crossed the border to launch ground offensives against Hezbollah, but according to Hezbollah's Al-Manar television, they were driven back by Hezbollah fighters. Al-Manar showed equipment that its warriors had captured from the Israelis. They had pushed as far as 32 kilometers inland from the Mediterranean, but came under Hezbollah fire and were stopped when an Israeli tank hit a land mine.

In addition, nine Israeli soldiers who had penetrated into Lebanon were ambushed by Hezbollah within Lebanese territory near the village of Maroun al-Rais. One Israeli strike at the village of Srifa near the border flattened 15 homes and killed a total of 17 civilians. Israel has also hit the cities Tyre and Baalbak. Israel bombed the offices of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command that is loyal to Syria, and also hit the Baalbak-Homs Road, severing all transportation routs to Syria.
Shortly after the war began, Israel hit and damaged the Damascus-Beirut Highway and the Homs-Tripoli Road. With all their airports out of service because of Israeli bombing, and with a sea blockade of Lebanon, the Lebanese only had one travel route through Syria to escape the hell that had broken out. It has now been sealed off. Hezbollah has responded by hitting northern Israel with more than 100 rockets and, for the first time, landing missiles on Nazareth. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) command of northern Israel, located in Safad, was also hit by Hezbollah missiles.

International inaction
The international community does not seem in a hurry to end the war. Spearheaded by the Americans (with the notable exceptions of Italy, Russia and France), countries have sided with Israel in its war on Hezbollah. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has announced that she will arrive in the Middle East early next week to press for a political solution to the crisis.

By then, the war would have entered its 14th day, with unimaginable humanitarian problems for Lebanon. Since the world is in no hurry, the war of attrition will start and probably last for many weeks - long enough until either side breaks under pressure.

United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan said that "hostilities must stop", but acknowledged, in speaking to the Security Council, that there were "serious obstacles towards reaching a ceasefire".

Attrition warfare, by definition, is a tactic where, to win a war, one's enemy must be worn down to the point of collapse by continuous losses in human life, arms and property.

A notable example of such a war was that between Egypt and Israel in 1968-70. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser knew that numerically the Egyptians outnumbered the Israelis by far and that the Israelis were less willing than the Arabs to suffer losses in property and human life.

Nasser's views on the war of attrition - which very well are probably what Nasrallah is thinking today - were described by veteran Egyptian journalist Mohammad Hasanayn Haykal: "If the enemy succeeds in inflicting 50,000 casualties in this campaign, we can go on fighting nevertheless, because we have manpower reserves. If we succeed in inflicting 10,000 casualties, he will unavoidably find himself compelled to stop fighting, because he has no manpower reserves."

So far Israel's military tactic has been to bomb entire neighborhoods where Hezbollah is located, along with all of south Lebanon. Israel has destroyed bridges, roads, seaports, airports and private property. It has disrupted electricity and caused a shortage in sugar, rice, fuel and many other daily commodities needed for the Lebanese to maintain their sanity.

By disrupting the livelihood of the Lebanese, it aims at turning public opinion inside Lebanon against Hezbollah and getting a greater number of people to say: "Hassan Nasrallah is responsible for all of this. He is responsible for the Israeli attacks that have destroyed our homes, our property and the infrastructure of Lebanon."

This is what happened in 1982 to Arafat, when even his closest supporters in the Muslim community of Lebanon were literarily begging him to leave Beirut. If this happens today, it will create conflict - and perhaps violence - between the Shi'ites and the rest of the Lebanese, disrupt the support for Nasrallah, and turn public opinion in favor of a ceasefire, even if it were at the expense of Hezbollah.

Some are even fearful that secretly armed non-Shi'ite groups in Lebanon will take the law into their own hands and start to fight the Shi'ite guerrillas on their own, plunging the country back into the civil-war atmosphere of 1975-90.

This explains why the IDF is not only targeting Hezbollah strongholds. It wants every Lebanese to suffer so he or she can blame Nasrallah and Hezbollah. It has hit a church in Rashayya, landed a missile in the Ashrafiyyieh neighborhood of Beirut, and targeted a base for the Lebanese army, killing seven soldiers and four officers.

On Tuesday, Israel hit a convoy of assistance sent to Lebanon from the United Arab Emirates, destroying an ambulance and a truck loaded with medicine. It later hit three trucks carrying sugar and rice near the Christian town of Zahle - the "town of wine and poetry".

Many in Lebanon are becoming increasingly disgruntled with the attacks, but are not yet blaming Hezbollah. This needs time because at this stage the Lebanese are still saying: "This is not a war against Hezbollah. If it were, why are we being attacked? This is a war on Lebanon."

Israel is waiting for public opinion to turn in its favor - and this happens when human loss and misery become unbearable. Hezbollah is also investing in time, waiting until enough damage is inflicted on Israel to force Olmert to stop his attacks.

Both parties are waiting until public opinion in each other's country starts saying no to bloodshed. This has not happened yet in Israel, and according to a recent poll published in the London-based Al-Hayat, 81% of Israelis want to continue war and 58% want the war's final outcome to be the destruction of Hezbollah.

Morale among Nasrallah's men is also still very high. Destroying Hezbollah from a distance is too difficult for Israel. Its fighters are fortified in secret hiding places, tunnels and bunkers under the Lebanese capital that they have been preparing for years.

To date, according to Hezbollah media, only a handful of its members have been killed by Israeli bombs. The rest of the casualties have been civilian. Hezbollah can sustain distant missile attacks for a long period - longer than Israeli public opinion is likely able to tolerate bombs falling on Haifa, Safad or Acre.

According to Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres, in a recent interview with Sky News, Hezbollah has a total of 12,000 missiles. It has only fired 1,500 of them on Lebanon. At this rate, with 1,500 missiles a week, this war would last for another eight weeks - unless Iran manages to send more arms to Hezbollah.

Israel realizes that eliminating Hezbollah from afar is difficult - if not impossible. Thus Israel will be forced to launch a ground invasion into south Lebanon to root out Hezbollah. On Wednesday, Defense Minister Amir Peretz said Israel would be willing to invade to achieve this end. While touring sites hit by Hezbollah missiles in northern Israel, he said, "If we need to carry out action which will make clear that we can reach anywhere, we will carry out those actions without hesitation."

But this also is very difficult for Israel in terms of logistics, and worldwide public opinion. If the IDF does cross the border into Lebanon, it will have to fight the Shi'ite guerrillas in the suburbs of Beirut and in the south. Hezbollah is good with street warfare, especially in its own territory.

The fighters also know the mountains, the roads and the underground. Israel would be fighting a war in completely unfamiliar territory and would suffer massive loss of life if it engaged in ground combat and street warfare with Hezbollah.

The only factor that could turn the tables in Israel's favor is if it kills Nasrallah in combat. The morale of the Hezbollah resistance would be greatly shaken and its command would suffer a dramatic setback. But it looks as if Nasrallah is well protected and certainly he will not make himself an easy target.

Therefore, destroying Hezbollah by war is very difficult. On the other hand, destroying Israel is also impossible for Hezbollah. It will get the upper hand in war only if Iran enters the battle, and Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has said that he will only be dragged into war if Israel attacks Syria.

Olmert, fighting the Palestinians at home and Hezbollah in Lebanon, would not want to drag himself into more war and open fronts with Damascus and Tehran. The United States, being Israel's No 1 ally, also will not allow Hezbollah to defeat Israel - or even force it to agree to a ceasefire on Hezbollah's terms.

Washington will continue to support this war of attrition until casualties and humanitarian disaster ruin the lives, morale, finances and psychology of the Lebanese people. Then they will push Hezbollah back into the Lebanese heartland, and lobby for UN peacekeeping troops on the Lebanese-Israeli border.

With that done, Hezbollah would have no battleground from which it could launch a war on Israel. Its arms would be useless. It would have no choice but to transform into a 100% political party in the Lebanese political system, with no military agenda. If the US continues to place full support behind Olmert, this very well might be the last military battle of Hezbollah.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Troops poised for ground offensive

By Richard M Bennett

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have undoubtedly prepared for the eventuality of a ground invasion of the Lebanon. It has called up a considerable proportion of those reserves earmarked for the Northern Command, which covers both the Lebanese and Syrian battlefronts.

While the air offensive is spectacular and highly effective in destroying the civilian infrastructure of Lebanon and targeting important members of Hezbollah's leadership, the only truly effective means of destroying the terrorist group's military capability is with ground troops and occupation of the areas used to fire missiles into Israel.

Only ground troops can be expected to find the hidden arms dumps and command bunkers and seal the borders with Syria to prevent reinforcements and replacement weapons reaching Hezbollah.

It now only awaits the political decision from Jerusalem before the army will try to finish the job started by the air force.

IDF ground operations
The current ground actions have been limited thus far to concentrated artillery barrages and special forces operations used to identify and target Hezbollah defensive positions and to some extent prepare the battlefield for any future ground invasion.

These have not been without considerable risk to the IDF, as without doubt the main Hezbollah combat units are well trained, heavily armed and above all, fanatically motivated to fight.

Assuming that any future invasion of Lebanon will be restricted to destroying the Hezbollah infrastructure in the southern part of the country and the lower Bekaa Valley, then it is likely that no more than four or five armored and mechanized brigades, supported by special forces and additional mobile artillery units, would attempt to quickly push about 30 kilometers to the north and establish defensive positions along the Litani River.

However, this has a number of serious military drawbacks for Israel.
# Hezbollah missiles would still have the range to hit deep within Israel.
# A considerable percentage of Hezbollah's most valuable assets would still be beyond the new Israeli frontline.
# Syria and Iran, via Syria, would still be able to re-supply and even reinforce Hezbollah.
# Israel's advanced positions would have a dangerously exposed flank opposite Syria.
# It would allow international diplomatic pressure time to halt the Israeli advance along the Litani and make it very difficult for Israel to then push further north, even if the military situation demanded it.

Therefore, a full-scale invasion, deploying a minimum of three full divisions, is also being considered, which would allow the IDF to reach the southern outskirts of Beirut, occupy large parts of the Bekaa Valley and seal the border with Syria.

Full-scale invasion
Despite the economic cost to Israel and the international outcry that it would undoubtedly cause, a full-scale invasion would have some considerable advantages for Israel.
It would provide Israel with bargaining counters and an opportunity to influence the future makeup of the Lebanese government.
# It would push Hezbollah so far to the north that only its very longest range missiles, fewer in number, would still be able to hit Israel.
# Israel's air defenses would be given more time to track and destroy incoming missiles safely over Lebanon.
# Syria and Iran would find it far more difficult to re-supply Hezbollah.
# Israel's armored units in the Bekaa would then be stationed far beyond the present border and with a potential to swing even further north and therefore behind the main Syrian front line positions between the Golan and the capital, Damascus - thus providing the Syrians with a military threat to which they would have little or no answer in the immediate future.

Combat units
If there is a land invasion, whether limited or more ambitious, it is likely to be led by three of the IDF's most famous elite combat units. These are the GOLANI Mechanized Brigade, which would probably seal off or actually advance into the Bekaa Valley. The BARAK Armored Brigade with the most modern Merkava-3 battle tanks will probably punch its way up the heavily defended coast highway toward the Litani or onward to Beirut.

And finally the 7th Armored Brigade would probably be used to destroy Hezbollah forces between the Lebanese border and the town of Tibnin on the Litani River, but most importantly to support either of the flank units and exploit any opportunities.

Of these three elite units, only the BARAK is part of the Northern Command (PAZAN); the 7th and the GOLANI are part of the Army Commands Rapid Reaction Force. This also includes at least eight other elite armored, airborne and parachute brigades.

Northern Command
The Northern Command when fully mobilized for war would include the following major units:
# 36th Armored Division (three to four armored brigades) - a regular unit.
# 91st Regional Division
# 252nd Reserve Armored Division
# ADOM (Eilat) Reserve Armored Division
# PELED Reserve Armored Division
# YOFFE Reserve Armored Division

These are supported by independent mechanized infantry brigades, additional mobile artillery, combat engineers with bridging equipment and numerous special forces units, including the PAZAN 12 and PAZAN 14 Northern Command Special Combat Teams for operations behind enemy lines and the T'ZASAM Special Reconnaissance Team capable of airborne insertion for visual reconnaissance operations deep within enemy territory.

Northern Command, even without significant reinforcement, would at full strength have about 180,000-200,000 men and women, several thousand battle tanks and about 3,000 armored combat vehicles and self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket and missile launchers.

IDF air operations
The current air offensive against Hezbollah and the infrastructure of Lebanon is being carried out mainly by the following units:
KANAF-1
# 109 Squadron "The Valley Squadron" F-16D Block 30 Barak
# 110 Squadron "Kings of the North" F-16C/D Block 30 Barak
# 117 Squadron "First Jet" F-16C/D Block 30 Barak operating from Ramat David Air Base, southeast of Haifa.

KANAK-4
# 101 Squadron "First Fighter" F-16C/D Block 40 Barak
# 105 Squadron "Ha'Akrav" ("The Scorpions") F-16C/D Block 40 Barak
# 144 Squadron "Guardians of the Arava" F-16A/B Netz operating from Hatzor Air Base, east southeast of Ashdod

KANAF-8
# 106 Squadron "The Point of the Spear" F-15C/D
# 133 Squadron "Knights of the Twin Tail" F-15C/D
# 114 Squadron "Super Frelon" 20 CH-53-2000 (Troop carriers)
# 118 Squadron "Nocturnal Birds of Prey" 20 CH-53-2000 (Troop carriers) operating from Tel Nof Air Base, east of Ashdod on the coast.

KANAF-30
# 160 Squadron "Northern Cobra" AS-1S III Cobra (anti-tank and ground support)
# 161 Squadron "Southern Cobra" ("First Attack") AS-1S III Cobra (anti-tank and ground support)operating from Palmachim Air Base, south of Tel Aviv.

Support
These units are being supported by other air combat units based in central and southern Israel as and when necessary. In the event that a long-range strike is required on Syrian or even Iranian targets, the strategic long-range aircraft of KANAF-6, 69 Squadron "Ha'patishim" ("Hammers") 25 F-15I based at Hatzerim AB, southern Israel, west of Beersheba, would be called on to support the F15C/D, F16C/D and F16I.

Israel has acquired at least 500 US BLU-109 "bunker buster" bombs and significantly a fleet of B707 in-flight refuelers, giving the IDF an extended reach of more than a 1,000-mile radius.

AFI Research provides expert information on the world's intelligence services, armed forces and conflicts. Contact rbmedia@supanet.com

(Copyright 2006 AFI Research. Used with permission.)

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A job half done

On Thursday, Israeli Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz, who is a member of the country's security cabinet, told the press that after more than one week of military operations against Lebanon, Hezbollah's offensive capabilities had been cut in half. Mofaz added that Israel was determined to finish the task and to annihilate the rest of Hezbollah's capabilities.

While the regional political-strategic context suggests that the ongoing Israeli-Lebanese conflict needs to be analyzed in light of the interests of other Middle Eastern players, Israel's primary security goals are strictly related to Hezbollah's offensive arsenal.

The administration of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert insists that Israel's strategic goals in the conflict are the destruction of Hezbollah's rocket-launching capabilities, the elimination of the organization's leaders, and the disruption of its chain of command.
While the task of physically destroying Hezbollah's offensive capabilities seems possible, notwithstanding tactical difficulties, the goal of virtually ending Hezbollah as an organization will probably backfire since the group is deeply rooted in Lebanese society and, most important, such an action would inevitably cause massive civilian casualties.

At the start of the present conflict, Israeli and Western military intelligence agencies seemed surprised by Hezbollah's rocket arsenal, which had been believed to be less substantial than it proved to be. After Hezbollah fired Fajr-3 rockets (range: 40 kilometers) at Haifa, a turning point was reached in the conflict.

In the first hours of fighting, Western intelligence agencies declared that Hezbollah possessed more than 10,000 Katyusha rockets (range: 20km), hundreds of Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets (range: 40 and 75km, respectively), dozens of C-802 missiles (range: 120km), and even a small, but unknown number of Zelzal-2 rockets capable of a 200km range and an explosives capacity of 600 kilograms.

Paradoxically, Israel's sophisticated anti-ballistic capabilities are more vulnerable to Hezbollah's rockets than to the much more powerful missiles such as Scud or Shahab, since the latter missiles are larger and fly at a higher altitude, making them easier to shoot down. Israel will not have the necessary laser defense technology to destroy the smaller rockets until 2008.

Such an arsenal gave Hezbollah the capability to strike all major Israeli cities such as Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, thus threatening Israel's core. After Hezbollah's retaliatory strength became clear, the Israeli military began to perceive the threat differently, with military analysts saying that some of Israel's worst fears were coming true. Therefore, the Olmert administration considered its vital interests at stake and decided that a decisive victory against Hezbollah needed to be achieved at all costs.

Such a decisive victory, however, may be more complicated to achieve than it appears. Although the Israelis can overcome tactical difficulties, such as the tracing of all launch infrastructure deployed by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, they cannot rely solely on air strikes since they are trying to eliminate Hezbollah from southern Lebanon permanently.

As often happens in conflict, strategic and political goals are difficult to harmonize. Whereas the destruction of rockets and the related infrastructure is feasible and internationally acceptable, hunting and killing militants requires a ground invasion. Obviously, such an invasion must not be perceived as the prelude to an Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, but instead seen as a rapid operation intended to "clear" the region.

However, ground invasions and open fighting are unpredictable, and they raise tricky political questions. Israel is already under pressure by the United Nations and some of its traditional Western allies because the air campaign against alleged Hezbollah's ramparts in Beirut, Tyre and other Lebanese towns is causing hundreds of civilian casualties and thousands of refugees.
Such a fact may give Hezbollah - an organization already deeply entrenched in the Lebanese Shi'ite community - a window of opportunity to increase its prestige and influence in Lebanon, thus preventing Israel from achieving a political victory, notwithstanding its military superiority.

Additionally, Hezbollah militants, chased by Israeli forces, are likely to escape to Syria, which may cause Israel to act militarily inside Syrian territory, a move that could trigger a regional expansion of the conflict, although Damascus will try to refrain from intervening directly in the fight until it is necessary or is on favorable terms.

In spite of such drawbacks, expect Israel steadily to pursue the goal of the destruction of Hezbollah's arsenal and to launch a rapid invasion of southern Lebanon to eliminate Hezbollah's presence in the region quickly. At the same time, it will seek out Lebanon's army and the United Nations to negotiate a withdrawal in exchange for the implementation of UN Resolution 1559 (passed in September 2004), which ordered Hezbollah to disarm.

Look for the United States to maintain its near-total support for Olmert, since Washington seeks to weaken Syria's and Iran's influence in the region and is obviously keen on annihilating Hezbollah's offensive capabilities.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah's political influence in Lebanon and even among the Palestinians may increase at the end of the current conflagration. Furthermore, the United States and Israel will continue to see the Iranian and Syrian governments as the main threats to the region and will continue to apply pressure on them. The Middle East is set for a long political conflict, with further warfare likely to come in the near future.

Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG22Ak05.html

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The arms that keep Hezbollah fighting

By Jason Motlagh

Nearly a quarter-century after Israeli forces pummeled Beirut to the hellish crescendo of an explosion every three seconds, a rebuilt capital crumbles one artillery strike at a time as Israel seeks to wipe out the enemy it spawned.

Israeli officials have stated in no uncertain terms their intent to bomb the radical Shi'ite movement Hezbollah into submission and "change the equation" to end further missile attacks over the border.

But Hezbollah today bristles with a weapons inventory far beyond the suicide tactics used in the 1983 bombing of the US Embassy and marine barracks a year later that first minted its name in terror.

Western intelligence officials and experts say the Iran-sponsored militants have stockpiled enough firepower to sustain a protracted fight against the Jewish state that, while asymmetrical, threatens all of northern Israel and possibly much further.

Katyusha rockets, the longtime staple of Hezbollah's arsenal, have rained down on Israel at the consistent rate of about 100 per day since fighting erupted on July 12 after its kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers over the border. It is estimated that militants have between 10,000 and 12,000 Katyushas, of which roughly 3% have been used to date. If Hezbollah kept up the current volume of its barrages, fighting could go on until early October, John Pike, director of military studies group GlobalSecurity.org, told Asia Times Online.

Unfortunately, this bleak outlook is shared by both Israel and Hezbollah. Israeli army chief of staff Dan Halutz projected in an address to Israel Defense Forces this week that the military campaign in Lebanon "may continue for an extended period of time".

Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, the target of 23 tonnes' worth of Israeli bombs on Wednesday, told Al-Jazeera television that Hezbollah would not surrender the abducted Israeli troops "even if the whole universe comes [against us]", without a prisoner exchange. Other reports indicate he soon intends to order "hundreds" of long-range missiles to be fired at Tel Aviv - a move Israeli officials insist would spell doomsday not only for Hezbollah, but for benefactors Iran and Syria.

Military analysts are uncertain as to the extent of Hezbollah's mid- and long-range missile stocks, but most concur with Israeli intelligence that they include the Iranian-made Fajr-3, with a 45-kilometer range, and maybe the 200km Zelzal, which in theory could reach as far as Tel Aviv.

New evidence of Hezbollah's upgraded operational capacity came in the form of a crippling strike on an Israeli warship on July 14, attributed to a radar-guided C-802 missile of Iranian origin. This has prompted some Israeli officials and military officers to trumpet fresh justification for a preemptive move against Iran, whose president has famously called for Israel's erasure from the map of the Middle East.

However, questions linger over Iran's role in the latest crisis. "It's hard to tell if the current festivities are driven by internal, local considerations peculiar to Hezbollah or are manifestations of [Iranian President Mahmud] Ahmadinejad's grand strategy," Pike said, stressing that whatever the reality was, the situation was inherently fluid and subject to change.

Encouraging Hezbollah action as Iran's frontline arm against Israel could work in Iran's favor without major backlash, he said, pending the strategy succeeds in mobilizing the Arab and Muslim worlds against a common enemy for a later showdown.

It's no secret that Tehran's material support for Hezbollah has continued ever since it founded the movement in 1982 to oust Israel from Lebanon. Iran remains as keen as ever to export its Shi'ite Islamic revolution further afield, some would argue, to lay the groundwork for a fated apocalypse.

But the mullahocracy today provides aid and arms to the tune of $25 million to $50 million a year, according to GlobalSecurity.org, much less than the hundreds of millions prior reports have claimed.

Charges that advisers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have increased their presence in Lebanon are also under dispute. Significant numbers of IRGC personnel have traveled to the region in years past, yet the "days of IRGC-led training camps in Lebanon seem to be over", Anthony Cordesman, a strategy expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, said in a report released on Tuesday. "Until there are hard facts, Iran's role in all of this is a matter of speculation," he wrote.

As for assertions that Hezbollah has received upgraded weapons technologies and long-range rockets from Iran to stir trouble in the Mideast at Tehran's behest, Cordesman contends they are "best guess" estimates, arguing that Hezbollah uses Iran "as much as it is used".

Experts do agree that despite the poor accuracy of Hezbollah's short-range missiles, which can seldom be relied on for more than a "lucky strike" on target, they are still effective.

Short-range Hezbollah missiles are almost impossible to overcome by Israel's advanced missile defenses because of their minimal trajectory. And recent launches against the northern port city of Haifa demonstrate that sporadic, random strikes can paralyze urban populations. According to Pike, even if Hezbollah cuts back rocket launches from 100 a day to 10 every other day to preserve stockpiles as time wears on, they would have in large part succeeded. "It's not so much the fact that Israelis are killed," he said, "but that the fear of being killed is sown."

Hezbollah's use of southern Lebanon as a staging ground for mortar and rocket attacks against Israeli military outposts and civilian areas has kept Israel off balance since 1982, a status quo it wants to end by relentless bombardment.

This has entailed strikes on Hezbollah's primary headquarters in southern Beirut to cut off communications links - with unprecedented civilian collateral damage. But recent cases in Iraq and Afghanistan show that air campaigns are doomed to fail unless they are backed by full-fledged ground forces, a strategy Israel is loath to employ after an 18-year Lebanon occupation that bled them out of the country.

Still, limited numbers of Israeli special forces have already made incursions into southern Lebanon to root out militants and destroy hidden weapons caches/launchers.

Israeli military planners wanted to carve out space to pave the way for larger ground forces, the New York Times reported on Thursday. They are also trying to "create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism", Edward P Djererian, former US ambassador to both Israel and Syria, told the Times.

Gun battles raged along the border on Thursday, with Israel warning residents of the region to flee "immediately" in an apparent signal a ground offensive to secure a buffer zone draws nearer.

But as infrastructure is shattered and the death toll mounts - 330 Lebanese killed, mostly civilians, and more than half a million displaced as of Thursday night - the grassroots population will be progressively less inclined to throw their weight behind moves to rein in Hezbollah.

Iran, lurking in the shadows, stands to benefit the longer Hezbollah intransigence can hold out. Its gift of short-range weapons has enabled Tehran to wage a survivable proxy fight, coordinated or not, that distracts international attention from its underground nuclear activities.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah "shows the Arab and Muslim world that Iran is a government willing to strike at the Israeli enemy - even though it is not Arab or Sunni", Cordesman noted. "Israel's reprisals ... make it seem in Arab and Muslim eyes as if Iran supports 'freedom fighters'."

Hezbollah's Nasrallah recently declared that Israel had created "a historic opportunity to score a defeat against the Zionist enemy". Taken literally, this is absurd; in a symbolic sense, there lies a heavy grain of truth.

Jason Motlagh is deputy foreign editor at United Press International in Washington, DC. He has reported freelance from Saharan Africa, Asia and the Caribbean for various US and European news media.

Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.

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