Asia Times Special

Asia Times:
Osama's answer to Iraq's violence

By Syed Saleem Shahzad
Oct 26, 2006

KARACHI - That the spiral of sectarian killing between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq has reached crisis point is evidenced by a recent landmark gathering of prominent religious scholars from both sects at which they called for an end to the violence.

In a joint declaration, signed at Al-Safa Palace overlooking the Holy Kaaba in Mecca, the religious scholars, in a move toward mutual recognition unprecedented in Iraq, called for a complete end to sectarian killings.

Meeting under the auspices of the 56-country Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, a member organization of the OIC, the Shi'ite and Sunni scholars called on Iraqis in plain terms to stand united in protecting the independence, unity and territorial integrity of their country. "This is necessary," they said, "in order to put an end to the [foreign] occupation and restore and reinstate Iraq's Arab-Islamic role."

The declaration, in essence a fatwa, has received full approval and endorsement from key Shi'ite and Sunni leaders in Iraq, most notably from influential Shi'ite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
OIC secretary general Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu said he could not say what effect the decree would have, admitting, "It is a moral obligation. Neither the OIC, nor anyone else, has power over the consciences of men."

This, in a nutshell, is the problem in Iraq: militia and other leaders no longer have control over the "consciences of men", and a seemingly endless circle of violence appears to be the result.

Tracing the roots

A security memo circulated among various intelligence organs of the countries involved in the US-led "war on terror" (including in Pakistan) tells how, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Vezarat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar (VEVAK - Iranian intelligence) launched an operation to assassinate Iraqi Ba'ath Party leaders to root out anti-Iranian Aflaqism (Michael Aflaq was the founder of the Ba'ath Party).

Members of the Shi'ite Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq's Badr Organization and Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, who were trained by Iranian intelligence for decades, were to be used for the mission.

They were given lists of Iraqi military officers, academics and intellectuals to be eliminated. The majority of them were Sunnis, with a few being Shi'ite and Christian. Many were known to have been killed.

This period marked the emergence of militias in Iraq, but these "official" outfits were soon joined by a growing number of small, home-grown, paramilitary-style brigades formed by local tribes, religious leaders and political parties to settle their own scores.

Initially, they had defined goals, but over time many of them deteriorated into little more than bands of bloodthirsty thugs beyond the control of their original leaders.

For the US administration to lean on the Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki to disarm the militias, then, is of little help as they appear to be a will unto themselves and, lacking ideological or organizational backing, are certainly beyond the authority of Baghdad.

Ignoring Osama bin Laden

In many encounters with people in Pakistan's Waziristan tribal areas who were once a part of Osama bin Laden's close circles, this correspondent is clear that while the al-Qaeda leader had very strong ideas that rejected Shi'ite philosophies, he kept himself away from any sectarian confrontations.

That is why he always maintained a distance from such people as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the erstwhile leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq who is attributed with significantly ramping up Sunni-Shi'ite violence before his death this year at the hands of US forces.

Bin Laden believes that Shi'ites should not be alienated and that, in alliance with Sunnis, they could end the United States' imperial adventure in Iraq.

Indeed, it appears that some months before Zarqawi died he had been prevailed on by bin Laden and his deputy, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, to stop attacks against Shi'ites and concentrate on forging an anti-US bloc.

Judging by the escalation in sectarian killings, it appears to have been too little too late.

In Pakistan, the militant Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) played havoc against Shi'ites. When the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan, most LJ members fled to Afghanistan, where in al-Qaeda training camps they were motivated toward global jihad and forced to give up their narrow anti-Shi'ite perspectives.

It worked to some extent. After the Taliban's retreat in 2001, the LJ divided into two factions. One remained involved with al-Qaeda, while a smaller faction stayed committed to killing Shi'ites. The latter group thus became isolated, which enabled the intelligence agencies to track down members. Most of them are now either dead or behind bars.

Any plan to defuse the situation in Iraq will require a similar approach. From the top, an attempt needs to be made to bring back as many renegades as possible into the spiritual and ideological fold.

Thereafter, intelligence operations would have to infiltrate the myriad networks and identify those isolated at the grassroots level, and then use brute force to crush them.

The latest call by Shi'ite and Sunni religious leaders could be the first step in this direction.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com

Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Playing the numbers game with death

By Tom Engelhardt

Recently, speaking of his war in Iraq, US President George W Bush put the Vietnam analogy back in the public eye. He was asked by the American Broadcasting Co's George Stephanopoulos whether New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman was on the mark in suggesting that what "we might be seeing now is the Iraqi equivalent of the Tet Offensive".

Bush's reply: "Mm-hmm. He could be right. There's certainly a stepped-up level of violence. And we're heading into an election."

The nationwide Tet Offensive has, of course, long been seen as
the turning point in the Vietnam War, the moment when the US political establishment lost both the media and the American public in its Vietnam venture. That's what Bush was certainly alluding to, though the present chaos in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq hardly qualifies as a "Tet Offensive" and, as the polls indicate, the American public had already been lost to his war.

Nonetheless, for Bush, who (like the rest of his administration) had previously avoided Vietnam-analogy admissions like the plague, it was certainly a sign that he feared he had lost the war he had fought most fiercely since September 12, 2001 - the war to pacify the American public and the media. No US administration in memory has devoted more time to thinking out and polishing its language, its signature phrases and images, in the pursuit of war; so, for instance, the announcement that the president is now "cutting and running" from his own signature phrase "stay the course" - one-half of the linguistic duo (the other being, of course, "cut and run") with which he and top adviser Karl Rove had clearly planned to drive the Democrats into retreat in the mid-term election period - is no small matter. (White House press spokesman Tony Snow: "[Stay the course] left the wrong impression about what was going on. And it allowed critics to say, well, here's an administration that's just embarked upon a policy and not looking at what the situation is, when, in fact, it's just the opposite.")

If this is, in any sense, a turning-point moment, then it's important to take another look at aspects of the war on the home front that this administration has fought so relentlessly these last years and is now losing - the first being its image wars in regard to Iraq and the second, the numbers games it has played when it came to deaths in Iraq.

Breaking up is hard to do

When it finally began to penetrate the Bush administration that things were going badly in Iraq, the imagery came fast and furious on the home front. First there were those "tipping points", along with the "landmarks of progress", such as the official turning over of sovereignty to the Iraqis in June 2004 or the various elections, especially the purple-finger one of January 2005. The "landmarks" have by now crumbled. "Progress" is a word largely restricted to the hallucinatory world of Dick Cheney, and as for those "tipping points", it's not that they're gone, it's just that these days they're all tipping the other way.

Former Bush State Department official Richard Haas, for instance, claimed only the other day that "we are reaching a tipping point both on the ground but also in the political debate in the United States ... about Iraq. We are reaching the point ... where simply more of essentially the same is going to be a policy that very few people are going to be able to support." Similarly, Chris Wallace asked Senators John Warner and Joe Biden on Fox News Sunday: "Have we now reached a tipping point in Iraq where President Bush's open-ended commitment to creating a unified, stable, democratic Iraq has to be reconsidered?" (Time magazine caught the irony of an administration image switching teams this way in a headline: "A tipping point for Iraq - here at home".) Gary Samore, Haas's colleague on the Council on Foreign Relations, tipped the image even further: "We are now way past the tipping point on the ground in Iraq. But it is doubtful there will be any change of course until we see the results of the mid-term elections." Think of us, then, as at a blowback tipping point.

For a while, in 2004-05, administration officials and US military officers also spoke of "turning the corner" in Iraq - an image that edged, however unconsciously, right up to the dark entrance to the Vietnam era's infamous "tunnel" at whose end, it was always hoped, you would see "the light". All such imagery was invariably linked to mini-schedules of progress. It was usually said that the next three to six months or even a year would be crucial in determining whether the tipping point had truly tipped or the corner had actually been turned. But when the allotted time passed - sometimes far earlier - and around each corner proved to be but another armed disaster, all these images wore out their welcome.

Then, in late 2005, the Bush administration suddenly began falling back to new, far more alarming, far less optimistic images (though with the same mini-schedules attached). As panic spread after the blowing up of the Golden Mosque in Samarra last February and an internecine struggle already long under way at a low level suddenly ratcheted up, they began to insist, defensively, that Iraq had not yet reached the point of civil war. And yet they found themselves at, or near, or heading for "the precipice" (or "the brink") from which you could stare down into the ominous Iraqi "abyss" (or the "chasm") of full-scale civil war. In those months, if we had indeed reached that precipice and glanced down, we were also reassured that we had "stepped back", and that time - those same coming months - would only tell whether we had stepped back for good.

Of course, the months passed and it turned out that if we had stepped back, the Iraqis hadn't. So, in the spring of 2006, a new administration image arrived on the scene. With the installing of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, we had, it was said, a "last chance" in Iraq, a brief window of opportunity - call it six months - to turn things around. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's party, on visiting Baghdad last April to pressure the new prime minister, was caught by a New York Times reporter, making exactly this point. Now, six months later at the brink of America's own "tipping point" mid-term elections, with the Battle of Baghdad, the "key" to the president's "victory strategy", suddenly proclaimed a failure by a US military spokesman in that capital, another fallback position in the endless war of images has been reached.

Journalist John Burns of the New York Times quoted some of those anonymous military men who seem to swarm the corridors of Washington and Green Zone Baghdad this way: "Senior officers have spoken of the [Baghdad] campaign in ‘make or break' terms, saying that there would be little hope of prevailing in the wider war if the bid to retake Baghdad's streets failed."

So we're now at the make-or-break moment. Here's Kenneth Pollack, former Central Intelligence Agency official and a leading proponent of toppling Saddam Hussein: "My real fear is that we've already passed the make-or-break point and just don't realize it. Historians in five or 10 years may look back and say 2006 was the year we lost Iraq. That's my nightmare." Another right-winger, John Hawkins, in urging conservatives not to desert the president on foreign policy, writes that "2007 will be the make-or-break year in Iraq".

Given that the US has been breaking things in Iraq for some years now, this isn't the first time the image of breaking has arisen. Most famously, even before the 2003 invasion, there was then-secretary of state Colin Powell's warning to the president that came to be known as "the Pottery Barn rule": "If you break it, you own it." As it turned out, it wasn't true - neither of the Pottery Barn (a US retail chain) nor of Iraq.

The Bush administration has in essence succeeded in breaking Iraq, and yet, as events of recent weeks have shown, to the eternal frustration of its top officials, it doesn't own any of it except Baghdad's heavily fortified city-within-a-city, the Green Zone. The rest of Iraq seems to own them and, in the end, may destroy both Rovian dreams of a generation-long Republican lock on US politics and Bushian dreams of dominating the world for at least as long.

In frustration, some influential officials are giving serious thought to officially busting up Iraq. Like ancient Gaul, it is to be divided into three parts. As Texas Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison put it recently, she is willing to "consider the wisdom of somehow breaking up Iraq". No one, of course, finds it strange here that Hutchison or Senator Biden, or any other US official, should feel so free to suggest the dividing of Iraq into Kurdistan, Shi'astan and Sunnistan. No one asks whether it's "ours" to divide. Whatever, as they say. In any case, rest assured that, if breaking up Iraq was relatively easy, breaking it up will be, as the old song goes, hard to do.

There oughta be a law, of course. But as long as the Bush administration has no intention of setting a serious date for, or timetable for, departure from Iraq, the shadow war of images will only continue from fallback position to fallback position with no enemy in sight.

The latest Bush administration shuck is to present not itself, but the less than functional Iraqi "government" with a timetable - in the form of a set of "benchmarks" for confronting the militias running rampart in Iraq and deeply embedded in the police. That will, theoretically, offer another few months of delay before the results - already foreordained - officially come in.

In the meantime, it just continues. This Monday, for instance, Michael R Gordon, author of the best-selling Cobra II, had a front-page piece in the New York Times, "To stand or fall in Baghdad". In it he quotes Major-General J D Thurman, senior commander of US forces in Baghdad, this way: "It is a decisive period. [The Maliki government] either seize[s] the opportunity or they don't. If they don't, then our government is going to have to readjust what we are going to do, and that is not my call." According to "American commanders", however, "the viability of the strategy [of focusing military efforts on pacifying Baghdad] could not be properly assessed before the year's end".

Thus, thanks to yet another bogus mini-schedule, the final testing of Bush administration hopes always stays just beyond reach in the future. And without a genuine change of course, it always will; while the breaking, the burning, the torturing, the looting, the killing go on.

Numbers game with the dead

From the first, the issue of the Iraqi dead has been part and parcel of the Bush administration's image wars. For a long time (even after they started counting), administration and military officials, along with the president, remained on the page first bookmarked by then-Centcom (US Central Command) commander Tommy Franks during the early phases of the war in Afghanistan. "We don't do body counts," the general said.

We officially didn't do them, any more than we did "body bags" or returned the US dead from Iraq in the light of day on camera. This was all part of the administration's anti-Vietnam-War approach to Afghanistan and Iraq. We would not make those mistakes again. Instead, we would ensure success on the home front, where Vietnam-era officials were believed to have lost their war, by playing an opposites game.

Last December 12, however, Bush was faced with a reporter's question: "Since the inception of the Iraqi war, I'd like to know the approximate total of Iraqis who have been killed. And by Iraqis I include civilians, military, police, insurgents, translators."

To the surprise of many, the president responded for the first time with an actual number: "How many Iraqi citizens have died in this war? I would say 30,000, more or less, have died as a result of the initial incursion and the ongoing violence against Iraqis." When asked for the president's sourcing, press spokesman Tony Snow responded two days later with "media reports, which have cited information that suggests that some 30,000 people, Iraqi citizens, may have been killed".

As it happens, the White House has had something of a predilection for the pleasantly round number of 30,000. In 2003, before the invasion of Iraq, in the president's State of the Union address, he used that very number for Saddam's mythical stock of "munitions capable of delivering chemical agents"; and, post-invasion, for police put back on patrol in the streets of Iraq. In 2005, that number was cited both for "new businesses" started in Iraq and new teachers trained since the fall of Baghdad. In 2006, in the president's "Strategy for Victory", that was the number of square miles of their country that Iraqi forces were then primarily responsible for patrolling.

Last week, the president was challenged again at his news conference because of a recently published study in the respected British medical journal The Lancet that offered up a staggering set of figures on Iraqi deaths. Based on an actual (and dangerous) door-to-door survey of Iraqi households among a countrywide cohort of almost 13,000 people, the rigorous study estimated that perhaps 655,000 "excess deaths" had occurred in Iraq since the invasion, mainly due to violence. (Its lowest estimate of excess deaths came in just under 400,000; its highest above 900,000, a figure no one in the US cared to deal with at all.)
When asked whether, given the Lancet study, he stood by the number he had previously cited of 30,000 Iraqi deaths, Bush responded: "You know, I stand by the figure. A lot of innocent people have lost their life - 600,000, or whatever they guessed at, is just - it's not credible." The reporter answered, "Thank you, Mr President," and all and sundry turned to other matters.

And yet such a statement is little short of the darkest of jokes. Start with the fact that, by last December, 30,000 was already a ludicrously low-ball figure for the Iraqi dead of the war, occupation, insurgency, and incipient civil war. Early on, to give but one example of a study completely ignored in the US press, a group of Iraqi academics and political activists tried to research the question of civilian casualties, consulting with hospitals, gravediggers and morgues, and came up with the figure of 37,000 deaths just between March and October 2003, when they stopped because of the dangers involved. The cautious website Iraq Body Count, which now offers death statistics ranging from a low of 44,661 to a high of 49,610, was at that time in the 27,000-30,000-plus range, but that was only for "media-reported" civilian deaths, not all Iraqi deaths, which, as the US military surely knew, were far higher. An October 2004 Lancet study had estimated more than 100,000 excess deaths.

Then, consider that between December 12, 2005, and his news conference last week, even Bush has admitted that Iraq has been going through an exceedingly violent period. We know, for instance, that in just July and August, according to a United Nations report based on counts from the Baghdad central morgue and various hospitals, 5,106 Iraqis died, almost totally by violent means, often torture of the most hideous sort followed by execution on the killing grounds of the 23 or more militias US officials have counted in the capital. For the rest of Iraq add another 1,493 dead souls (while noting that the July count lacks a single death from al-Anbar province, the very heartland of the Sunni insurgency, where assumedly there simply were no officials willing to report them). All over the country, it's evident that bodies go officially unreported. The Washington Post's Ellen Knickmeyer recently pointed out, for example: "Bodies are increasingly being dumped in and around Baghdad in fields staked out by individual Shi'ite militias and Sunni insurgent groups. Iraqi security forces often refuse to go to the dumping grounds, leaving the precise number of bodies in those sites unknown."

So for Bush to "stand by" his almost year-old figure in the casualty wars - especially after this particular almost-year - while claiming that the Lancet study's figures weren't "credible", is, on the face of it, absurd. It's hardly less absurd that nothing significant was made of this in the media, that Bush was not called on the carpet for a figure that, even based on his own previous testimony, is close to criminally negligent.

The president said something else striking, while taking up the banner for 30,000 dead Iraqis. He certainly meant it to be the highest compliment he could bestow. "I applaud the Iraqis for their courage in the face of violence," he commented at his press conference. "I am amazed that this is a society which so wants to be free that they're willing to - that there's a level of violence that they tolerate."

In fact, there's no evidence whatsoever that Iraqis "tolerate" levels of violence that would horrify any society. For most Iraqis, life under such conditions is obviously hell on Earth. It's Bush who "tolerates" such levels of violence in the pursuit of his policies, so perhaps he should simply applaud himself.

The fact is that the Lancet figures have largely been avoided because most Americans, including most reporters, can't entertain the possibility that their country might actually be responsible for a situation in which almost 400,000, or about 655,000, or possibly 900,000-plus "excess" Iraqis have died. At the top end of that continuum, you would have to think of the recent wars and serial slaughters in the Democratic Republic of Congo or the genocide in Rwanda. At 655,000, you're talking about slightly more than the dead of the American Civil War. With the bottom figure, you're already at well over 100 times the dead of September 11, 2001, almost seven times the US dead of either the Korean or the Vietnam War, and more than three times the dead of atomized Hiroshima. And let's keep in mind that any of these figures are purely provisional, since Bush has more than two years to go in office and has sworn not to pull US forces out of Iraq before he departs, even if, according to the Washington Post's Bob Woodward, only his wife and dog still back him on the subject.

The Vietnam analogy, never far from the American consciousness, has been back in the press recently, but here's an apt Vietnam quote that seldom seems to rise to memory anymore. General William Westmoreland, commander of US Forces in Vietnam, offered the following explanation for similarly staggering Vietnamese body counts (an estimated 3 million Vietnamese died in that country's French and American wars): "The Oriental doesn't put the same high price on life as does a Westerner. Life is plentiful. Life is cheap in the Orient."

It's hard to avoid the thought that a similar attitude toward Iraqi lives and deaths is at work in the US government and in the media. After all, the kinds of denatured discussions now taking place about Iraqi deaths would be inconceivable if American deaths were at stake. Just consider, for instance, that the recent discovery of scattered human remains ("some as large as arm or leg bones") overlooked at Ground Zero in New York City has raised a furor and demands that all construction at the site be halted while it is thoroughly searched. Try to put that sort of concern for the dead back into the Iraqi situation or into such perfunctory, daily, inside-the-newspaper passages as:

In addition, about 50 bodies were collected Sunday around Baghdad, the capital, a figure considered high weeks ago but now routine. An Interior Ministry official said many of the victims had apparently been shot at close range and bore signs of torture.

How, then, do you even begin to grasp such losses in a war of "liberation" launched by your own country? How do you even begin to imagine such levels of suffering, death, and destruction, or the increasingly chaotic and degraded conditions in which so many Iraqis now live and for which we are certainly responsible?

Tom Engelhardt is editor of Tomdispatch and the author of The End of Victory Culture. His novel, The Last Days of Publishing, has recently come out in paperback. Most recently, he is the author of Mission Unaccomplished: Tomdispatch Interviews with American Iconoclasts and Dissenters (Nation Books), the first collection of Tomdispatch interviews.

(Copyright 2006 Tomdispatch. Used by permission.)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ26Ak03.html

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Iraqis fight over oil spoils

By Mohammed A Salih

ARBIL, Iraq - Through a steadily worsening security situation and deepening political divisions, a dispute is erupting between Kurdish leaders and the Baghdad regime over access to oil resources.

Kurdish authorities and the federal government in Baghdad have exchanged sharply worded statements recently in their rival claims for control over northern oilfields. The row is expected to intensify after the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), in charge of the three northern provinces Arbil, Sulaimaniya and Dohuk, presents an oil bill to the regional parliament.

This would then be a basis of claims from the federal government, and an assertion of rights over oil in the north.

Iraqi Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani said on Tuesday that Iraq planned to increase crude-oil production to 4.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) by 2010. Its production, currently at about 2.5mbpd, could rise to 6mbpd by 2012, Shahristani said.

Iraq is believed to have 115 billion barrels of oil reserves, though the government claims reserves of 214 billion barrels. The bulk of the oil is in the south and the northern region around Kirkuk. Japan and Iraq are negotiating details of a US$3.5 billion loan, primarily to be used to rebuild Iraq's oil sector.

Shahristani said Iraq is losing about 400,000bpd in crude-oil exports because of increasingly frequent attacks by saboteurs on pipelines in the northern part of the country.

The US Energy Department's data arm, the Energy Information Administration, estimates that exports averaged 1.6mbpd for September, and domestic consumption somewhere between 500,000bpd and 600,000bpd. In 2005, Iraq earned more than $20 billion in oil-export revenue. Iraqi Kurdistan accounts for about 22.5% of the Iraq's total reserves. Production, which is minimal currently, is targeted to reach 200,000 bpd over the short term and 1 million bpd thereafter.

In an attempt to calm the growing confrontation between the north and Baghdad, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged Kurdish leaders on her last visit to Kurdistan to make concessions to Baghdad on distribution of oil revenues.

Kurdish leaders agreed to share an unspecified portion of their revenues with Baghdad, but they said they would not hand over control of oil wells to the federal Oil Ministry.

"We have not made any concessions - and the KRG has constitutionally the right to exploit the oil wealth in areas under its control," said Dler Shaways, head of the Economic and Financial Committee of the Kurdistan parliament in Arbil. "It is part of the characteristics of federal systems that regions can govern themselves and control their revenues."

Accusing federal authorities of adopting "a colonialist approach in dealing with Kurdistan", Shaways said, "The regimes in Baghdad have so far used our oil wealth to buy bombs and destroy the country with it."

Disputes first emerged last December, when the KRG officially declared the discovery of oil in the northern town Zakho by a small Norwegian firm. Such oil explorations in the north have led Shi'ite Oil Minister Shahristani to declare that his ministry "isn't committed to oil investment contracts signed in the past ... by officials of the government of the Kurdistan region".

The Kurdish government in turn held out options other than co-existence with the federal government if it refused to recognize its authority over oil wealth in the north.

Over the course of the past three years, since the US-led invasion of Iraq, the Kurdish government has signed three production-sharing deals. These are with the Turkish companies Petoil in April 2003 and Genel Enerji in January 2004, and recently the Canadian company Western Oil Sands.

Much of the disagreement over oil management and revenue distribution has emanated from ambiguities in the text of the national constitution. It gives ownership of oil and gas resources to Iraqi people, but stipulates that "the federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields".

The phrase "present fields" has been interpreted by Kurdish officials as those which are producing oil already, not new fields.

Many see the oil dispute as a major battle of self-assertion for the Kurdish and Iraqi governments. Baghdad fears that Kurds' control of their oil wealth will give them powers challenging the central government's domain of influence.

Sunni Arabs, who constitute the core of insurgency against the US and the Iraqi government, are afraid that the Kurdish example might inspire Shi'ites to follow a similar path in their southern oil-rich regions, and leave their oil-barren central region impoverished.

(Inter Press Service)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ26Ak01.html